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o.

Introduction; PA-type sentences

There is a very common type of Spanish sentence which has the following
properties:
( i) One of the arguments of the verb is a noun phrase which
consists of an article (almost always a definite article) and a no\lll.
(ii)
There is also a dative pronoun dependent on the verb, and
(iii) the dative
pronoun is understood as the possessor of the definite noun.
(1)-(3) are
examples of this kind of sentence.
(1)

Le
ensuciaron
el
coche.
DAT they:dirtied the earl
'They got his car dirty.'

(2)

Le

(3)

Le

dinero.
todo el
robaron
the money
DAT they:robbed all
'They stole all his money.'
mano.
cortaron la
DAT they:cut the hand
'They cut his hand (off). I

I will refer to sentences of this kind as PA-type sentences.
0.1

Possessor Ascension (PA)

It has been suggested that sentences like (1)-(3) should be accounted for
under the theory of Relational Grammar by a relational configuration called
Possessor Ascension (PA).2 In this structure the possessor in a possessor-head
construction is a non-initial indirect object ("3") in the same clause in which
the possessor-head construction bears an initial grammatical relation (GR). The
relational network (RN) which defines PA is given in figure 1, along with the RN
involving PA which would be used for sentences (1)-(3).

Figure 1

PA

PA structure for (_!)-Cl)

el
coche
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o. 2

Arguments A and

!

for PA in Spanish

Two main arguments have been given to support a PA analysis for Spanish.3
They are as follows:
Argument A: PA has already been posited, and argued for against at least
some reasonable alternatives, in other languages (e.g. Chamorro, French,
Georgian, Southern Tiwa, Tzotzil) .4 Thus it is independently motivated as a
universally possible configuration. Using it to account for the Spanish data is
therefore more parsimonious; there is no need to posit a new kind of RN.
Argument B:
Positing structures with PA allows one to reflect the
similarity in meaning between sentences in languages with PA (e.g. the Spanish
sentences given above) and sentences in languages without PA (e.g. the English
translations of those sentences), where the Possessor remains as Possessor.
I would like to argue that PA is not the best way to account for sentences
( 1)-(3). They are better viewed as resulting from a structure with an "ethical
dative" (ED) and what we will call "Possessor Omission" (PO), both of which can
be independently motivated in Spanish.
1.
1.1

PA

.!!

not necessary in Spanish

In answer

~

argument A

Argument A is strong only if there exist no other universally available
structures which will accotmt for (1) to (3) and other such Spanish sentences.
Such is not the case. Positing PA allows us to account for two facts: (i) the
presence of the nominal understood as the possessor as a dative in the clause,
and (ii) its absence as on overtly marked posessor. Both of these facts can be
accounted for by independently needed mechanisms in Spanish. We will take them
up in reverse order.
1.1.1

Possessor Omission

1.1.1.1

PO and PD

Spanish in many constructions besides the PA-type construction exemplified
in (1)-(3) permits a nominal which is understood as possessed to appear with no
overt possessor. Sometimes the nominal which is understood to be the posssessor
will appear in the same clause with the nominal which it is understood to
possess.
In sentences (4) and (5) such constructions are illustrated with the
understood possessor as subject ("1") and as direct object ("2"), respectively.
( 4)

Levant6

la

mano.

he:raised the hand
'He raised his hand.'
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(5)

Lo
peg6
en la
cara.
ACC he:hit on the face.
'He hit him in the face.'

English speakers learning Spanish are likely to ask, when first confronted with
sentences like ( 4), whose hand is being referred to.
Spanish speakers know
that, 99 times out of 100, it is the hand of the subject of the sentence.
Sentences like (5) cause English speakers no trouble, because English has a
structure similar to the Spanish one. Yet a similar question would be perfectly
reasonable: whose face is being referred toi In fact a speaker of a language
like Aztec where the face must be obligatorily marked as possessed in such a
construction would likely be puzzled on just that point.
But English and
Spanish speakers both understand that it is the face of the direct object that
is being referred to.

Figure 2
under PD

pegar

3p.

sg.
sg.

~

3p.
sg.

la

mano

la

cara

(broken arcs are those arcs that are erased in surface graphs [i.e. deleted])

Two possibilities suggest themselves for representing sentences like (4)
and (5) by means of RN's. One is, in the spirit of Argument B above, to have an
initial Poss arc, with the nominal understood as Possessor multiattached, being
also the head of the 1- or 2-arc of the main clause. The Poss arc will then be
ignored or treated however Equi-victims are treated under the theory.5 We can
call this approach Possessor Deletion (PD). The PD proposal is represented by
the RN's in figure 2. The other possibility is to omit the Poss arc entirely,
leaving the nominal understood as possessor represented only as head of the 1or 2-arc. We can call this approach Possessor Omission (PO). The PO proposal
is represented by the RN's in figure 3.
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Figure 3
(_~) under PO

(~_) under PO

levantar

3p.
sg.

pegar

la
mano

3p.
sg.

3p.
sg.

1a:
cara

The PD and PO approaches differ over whether the conception of a possessive
relation is to be represented syntactically (the PD model) or only at some
semantic or conceptual level (the PO model). 'nle difference between them, while
important, is not crucial to the argumentation here; however, data and
argumentation relevant to deciding between them is presented in Sections
1.1.1.4, 1.2.1, and 2.3.
1.1.1.2

PA will not work

A third approach might be to try to account for sentences (4)-(5) by PA.
Assuming that PA advances possessors to become non-initial 3's, as it must to
account for (1)-(3), this approach would predict a 3 in the clause, and some
device would be needed to syntactically delete those 3' s so they would not show
This device ( 3-Deletion) would presumably delete 3 's
up as dative pronouns.
under coreferentiality with a 1 or a 2, but it would have to be constrained to
delete only 3's which are produced. by PA; other 3's would not be deleted. Up to
this point this approach might seem to be on a par with PO or PD; PA may be
independently motivated from (1)-(3), and it is not clear that a rule deleting
3's which have been produced by PA is any more complex or otherwise less
desirable than one deleting or omitting possessors.
However, there are also cases in which a PA-type structure like those in
(1)-(3) occurs, but in which the DAT is coreferential with the 1. For instance,
(6):
(6) a. Me

me:DAT

corte
I:cut

la
the

mano.

hand

b.*Corte

la
mano.
!:cut the hand
'I cut my hand. '

Thus it would not be true that all 3's produced by PA and coreferential with the
subject are or even can be deleted. For cases like (6), 3-Deletion would have
to be constrained somehow not to apply. On the other hand, if either PO or PD
is what is going on, it does not have to be so constrained, but can be used to
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explain the absence of the possessor in sentences like (6) as well as in
sentences like (4) and (5). (It is true that models with PO and PD will have to
give an explanation for why there is a dative in (6) but not in (4); such an
explanation is given in Section 1.1.2.)
Another fact that militates against the idea of using PA to account for
these sentences is that in sentences like ( 4) the 1 is not necessarily to be
understood as the possessor. If someone in an anatomy lab were carrying around
someone else's hand and raised it, (4) would be appropriate to describe the
situation; it would have to be translated in that case as He raised the hand.
PA and 3-Deletion would not be able to take care of such cases because there
would be no coreferential nominal to trigger 3-Deletion. (Notice that PD would
be involved in a similar problem; cf. Section 1.1.1.4.) Thus PO would be needed
anyway to account for the reading of (4) where the 1 is not the Possessor. If
it is needed for that case, ·it is more parsimonious to let it also account for
the other reading of (4) and for (5) and (6), rather than to posit PA and 3Deletion to account for them, for then 3-Deletion will not be needed. Using PO
alone is simpler than the alternative, which uses PA, 3-Deletion, and PO, and it
is therefore preferable.
1.1.1.3

PO or PD with a coreferential 3

Sentences (7) and (8) give examples of a similar construction in which the
understood Possessor is the (final) 3 of the clause.6
(7)

Le

(8)

Me
mand6
el
hijo.
me:DAT he:sent the son
'He sent his son to me./ He sent my son to me.'

mand6
el
hijo.
DAT he:sent the son
'He sent his son to him.'

( 7), in the English translation as well as in the Spanish, is ambiguous or
vague:
It is not clear whose son is being referred to, though it is almost
certain that it is either the son of the 1 or the son of the 3. In the Spanish
sentence it is not clear who is the possessor because there is no possessor
marking; in the English sentence it is because the 3 P• sg. possessor marking
could bear an anaphoric relationship to either the 1 or the 3, since both are 3
P• sg. It is also possible, though unusual, for the possessor to be understood
as some other 3 p. sg. nominal (masculine in English).
(8) also is ambiguous
( or vague) in Spanish as to whether the son of the 1 or the son of the 3 is
referred to, though in English the difference in person of the possessor
disambiguates the two senses, since it is overtly marked.
(Once again, the
Spanish sentence or the English sentence with his son could be interpreted with
some other 3 P• sg. nominal as the possessor.) Thus under PD (8) would result
from either of the two RN' s in figure 4. Under PO both versions of ( 8) would
have the RN given in figure 5.

SIL-UND Workpapers 1980

103

Figure 4
Two sources for(~) under PD

el
hijo

sg.

lp.
sg.

Figure 5

These sentences also should not be accounted for by PA.
In the first
place, if they were from PA there would be no explanation of the fact that the
DAT is understood as goal; the sentence does not mean He sent my son.
Also
there would be no explanation of why the person referred to by the DAT need not
be the possessor, but someone else may be understood as possessor (here, either
the 1 or some other 3 P• sg. nominal). In other words, PA would need goal-DAT
and PO anyway to account for these sentences, and once you have goal-DAT and PO
you do not need PA.
Crucially, then, as was the case with (4) and (5),
sentences (7) and (8), on the reading in which the son is the son of the
Indirect Object, will need RN'-s involving a device like PD or PO. Given such a
device, and given an explanation for the datives in sentences like ( 1)-(3)
{which will be offered in Section 1.1.2), the absence of an overtly marked
possessor in sentences (1)-(3) can be accounted for without PA.

While the difference between PD and PO is not crucial here, I would like to
present a couple of considerations that make me think that PO is preferable to
PD.
The first is that one would expect the deletion rule to act like other

SIL-UND Workpapers 1980

104

syntactic deletion rules such as Equi-NP Deletion in having a coreferential
trigger that comm.ands the nominal to be deleted.7 If we assume that PD must have
such a trigger to operate (and that PO need not), we can argue against PD in
favor of PO. Under that assumption the readings of (4), (7), and (8) on which
the possessor is not understood to be coreferential to any nominal in the main
clause could not be accounted for by PD.
Neither could sentences such as the
following:

(9)

Dama de mucho cascabel y
de mis temple
lady of much rattle
and of more temper

que el acero Toledano
than the steel Toledan

fue
dona Ana de Borjas, condesa de Lemos
she:was Lady Ana of Borjas, Countess of Lemos
Peru.
del
of :the Peru.

y
virreina
and Viceregent

Por tal la
S.M. dona Mariana de Austria,
tuvo
For such her :ACC she:had H.M. Lady Mariana of Austria,

que goberna la monarquia espailola durante la minoria de Carlos II;
who governed the monarchy Spanish during the minority of Carlos II;

pues al
nombrar virrey del
Peru
for upon naming_ viceroy of:the Peru

al

marido,

lo

OBJ: the husband, him.:ACC

provey6
de real cedula, autorizandolo
para que en el caso
she:provided of royal decree, authorizing:him for that in the case
de que el mejor servicio del
reino
le obligase a abandonar
of that the best service of:the kingdom DAT it:oblige to abandon
Lima, pusiese las riendas del
gobierno
en manos de su consorte.
Lima, he:put the reins
of:the government in hands of his consort.

'Dona Ana de Borjas ••• was a woman of quick wits and of truer temper
than Toledo steel. Her Majesty Doffa Mariana of Austria ••• considered
her to.be such; for when she named her (Ana's) husband Viceroy of
Peru, she gave him a royal decree, authorizing him, in case the
kingdom's best interest should take him away from Lima, to place the
reins of the government in the hands of his consort.'
In (9) (from Ricardo Palma) the nominal which is understood as the possessor of
marido does not appear in the same clause as the possessed nominal at all, but
only in a conjoined clause (in the pronominal shape la) and embedded way down in
another clause which is sister to the clause in question, this time referred to
as su consorte. In neither occurrence does that nominal command the possessed
nominal.
Therefore, if PD requires that the trigger command the target, it
cannot account for this sentence.
un burrito
jalando por un mecate a
un toro bravo,
it:was:coming a little:donkey pulling by a rope
ACC
bull fierce,

(10) Ven{a

a
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tapaojeado y
nariceado.
blindfolded and nose-pierced.

El burrito no corria
peligro
The donkey neg was:running danger

puesto que

given

los cuernos estaban tapados con un trozo de coleta.
that the horns
were
covered with a piece of gunny-sack

'A little donkey was coming, pulling a fierce bull, blindfolded and
with its nose pierced, by a rope. The donkey was in no danger, since
the bull's horns were covered with a piece of gunny-sack.'
There is no trigger in sentence (10) to cause the possessor of cuernos to
be deleted.
'fue nearest available trigger is un toro bravo, in the preceding
sentence. Yet, although the bull is clearly understood as the possessor, it is
not marked as such or even represented overtly in the sentence at all. Again,
if PD requires a trigger which commands its target, or even a trigger at all in
the same sentence, it cannot account for sentences like (10).
In fact, it is quite possible to find sentences in which there is no overt
trigger at all in the linguistic context. For instance, sentences like (11):
(11) Meter
la
pata es peligroso.
to:insert the hoof is dangerous
'It is dangerous to stick your nose in someone else's business.'
and many sentences in which possession is clear from the non-linguistic speech
situation (see the discussion of (12) and (13) ahead).
Thus, if PD depends on a t~igger commanding the nominal to be deleted, it
cannot account for many sentences in which possession is understood even though
the possessor is not overtly marked.
Something like PO would thus be needed
besides.
But PO can account for these S's and also those like (4)-(8) which
would motivate PD in the first place.
PD needs PO, but PO does not need PD.
Thus a theory with only PO is simpler than a theory with both, and therefore
preferable.
Notice that all these sentences are even less susceptible to analysis by PA
than by PD: PA would predict a 3 in the clause with the nominal understood as
possessed. Some totally weird and ad hoc mechanism would be needed to delete
those 3's while leaving many other 3's produced by PA alone.
Another consideration that makes me prefer the omission concept over the
deletion concept is this: There are many sentences in both English and Spanish
(and probably every other language in the 'WOrld) in which no possession is
overtly marked but in which possession is clearly understood from the speech
situation. For instance in sentence (12)
(12) Put it in the fridge.
the fridge may be understood in a given speech situation to be my fridge, your
fridge, or Fred's or Harriet's or Herman's. I do not think it really proper to
include a Poss arc in the initial syntactic structure of sentences like ( 12).
In fact, I do not think such a relationship is properly represented even in the
semantic structure of such a sentence, though it would be in the non-linguistic
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conceptual structure.8 Thus (12) would involve PO rather than PD. Yet I do not
think that it will be possible to draw a hard and fast line between cases like
this and cases of the sort discussed above. The possessive relationship will
have different degrees of salience and the identity of the possessor will be
identifiable to different degrees throughout a whole continuum of expressions
and situations. Some English examples are given in (13).
(13)

We're going in the car. (=our car)
Put the cat out. (=our cat)
I'll go ask the boss. (=my boss)
I got it from the old man. (=my father)
Give it to the little woman. (=your wife)
I have to take care of the kids tonight. (=my kids)
I'll have to ask the wife. (=my wife)
He took it on the nose. (=his nose)
I whOlllped him on the back. (=his back)

All of these sentences have a noun phrase of the form 'the Noun'.
A
relationship of possession is at least very probable in each of them; so
probable as to be certain in the last ones, less probable in the earlier ones.
Where does one draw the line~ Why does one need to draw the line~ Why can one
not simply say that even when possession is clearly perceived to be present, one
need not necessarily specify it linguistically~ That the cases in which it must
be specified are determined by each language and cannot be universally
predictedi That in a language like Spanish, a nominal that is conceived of as
possessed may simply be coded as definite (contextually unique), whereas in a
language like English the parallel nominal may be required to be coded as well
as conceived of as possessed~
The argument, then, is a sort of reductio ad absurdum based on the
assumption that it is improper to account for the absence of a possessor in
sentences like (12) by syntactic means.
If sentences like (1)-(8) (including
the English translation of (5)) are to be accounted for by PD (or PA) and not PO
(i.e., by syntax and not by the interface between conceptualization and
linguistic coding), then, unless someone can come up with a principled way to
determine where to draw the line, so should sentences like those in ( 13) and
(12). Which is absurd.
1.1.2

Ethical Datives (ED's)

In
for the
account
attempt

the previous section it was argued that if an accounting could be given
datives in sentences like (1)-(3), either PO or PD would permit us to
In this section I will
for those sentences without recourse to PA.
to account for those datives.

There is, in Spanish, a class of nominals marked as datives which have a
meaning something like "person affected intimately (and usually adversely) by
the action or state predicated ... 9 Often they can be translated into English by a
prepositional phrase with on. (14b) gives an instance of such a nominal.
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(14)

muri6.
a. Se
REFL he:died
'He (up and) died. I
D1Uri6.
le
REFL DAT he:died
'He (up and) died on h"Imo I

b. Se

Let us refer to these nominals ( following traditional terminology) as Ethical
Datives (ED's). I will assume that they bear on the final stratum a GR of 3:
that will explain the fact that they are marked with the dative case.
It is
probable that they would not be considered to be initial 3' s under most
relational analyses:
they can cooccur with clear indirect objects, which, if
both were initial 3's, would violate the Strata! Uniqueness Law.10
In the
absence of any clear indication as to what their initial GR would be, I will
simply mark them as initially bearing GRxThe RN for ( 14 b) would be as in
figure 6.11
Figure 6
(14b)

morirse

(16) under PD

(16) under PO

morirse

3p.
sg.

el
hijo

3p.
sg.

The meaning of these ED' s can be illustrated as follows.
Sentences like
(14b) are usually quite appropriate when talking about the deaths of one's close
relatives. Suppose that a man's son dies; (14b) would normally be appropriate
in describing the situation--men are normally affected intimately and adversely
by the deaths of their offspring. However, if the father had disowned the son
and was unaware of his whereabouts or of his death, then ( 14b) would be
inappropriate. Similarly, (15a) would be totally inappropriate for me to say,
but it would be appropriate for Tito's doctor, who presumably would want Tito to
live and would be adversely affected psychologically and/or professionally by
his death. Similarly, (15b) would be inappropriate for Americans to say, but it
would be quite appropriate for the Yugoslavs, especially if they loved Tito and
were therefore psychologically hurt by his death, or if they felt endangered by
his death.
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(15) a. Se
ne
nuri6
mariscal
el
REFL me:DAT he:died the Marshal
'Marshal Tito (up and) died on me.'
b. Se

nos
nuri6
mariscal
el
REFL us:DAT he:died the Marshal
'Marshal Tito (up and) died on us.'

Tito.
Tito
Tito.
Tito

It is possible to specify that the person who died in (14b) was the son of
the person affected. The resultant sentence is (16).
(16)

Se
le nuri6
el
hijo.
REFL DAT he:died the son
'His son (up and) died (on him).'

The absence of the possessor in (16) should be explained by PO or PD, just as it
was in the case of (8). RN's for (16) under PO and PD are given in figure 6.
The final structure of (16) bears a crucial similarity to that of (1)-(3).
(1)-(3) are transitive, and this is intransitive, but the important thing is
that the final stratum has a noun phrase with the definite article, which is
understood to be possessed by a person who is represented in the sentence by a
dative pronoun. I claim that the structures of (1)-(3) and (16) are in fact
exactly parallel, and that the datives in all those sentences are ED's. They
would have the structure given in figure 7 under PD, and that in figure 8 under
PO.

Figure 7
RN for (_!,}-(l) under ED-PD

(!.) under ED-PD

coche
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Figure 8
(!) under ED-PO

for (!)-(1_) under ED-PO

RN

ensuciar

3p.
pl.

el
coche

3p.
sg.

In Section 1.1.3 it is shown that this contention is consistent with a
number of facts in Spanish, and in Section 2 it is argued that the analysis
which results is preferable over the PA analysis.
One final fact about (16): At least 90 percent of the time it will be
understood as glossed: that the son is the son of the referent of the ED.
However, the sentence may also be understood in certain contexts as referring to
someone else's son. For instance if a doctor is treating a father and son for
injuries from an accident, and the son dies, (16) would be appropriate in that
situation with the ED referring to the doctor. Or if an anthropologist wants
desperately to study certain familial interactions and the son of the only
family that will do for his study dies, (16) would again be appropriate.
In
other words, where someone other than the parent of the son can be conceived of
as affected by the death of the son qua son, the ED in (16) can be understood to
refer to him. 'nlis same pattern holds true for other sentences with ED's also.
1.1.3

The data do not demand PA; ED's and PO will work

In the following sections I will present relevant data with which the ED-PO
hypothesis is consistent. These same data will be used in Sections 2.2 to 2.5
to argue for this hypothesis against PA; here my purpose is merely to show it to
be consistent with the facts of Spanish.
1.1.3.1

PA occurs only where the possessor

~

be viewed~ affected

As far as I know, every sentence like (1)-(3) where PA would be posited can
have the implication that the possessor is affected by the action of the
predicate.
This is quite apparent in. the examples given. One is typically
affected adversely by having one's car dirtied, one's money stolen, or one's
hand cut (off).
Other sentences are quite conceivable in which the possessor
will not be affected; in these PA cannot occur. For instance:
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(17) *Le
vi
al
DAT !:saw OBJ:the
'I saw his son.•12

hijo.
son

Also, when the person understood as possessor is just recently dead (during the
period when a dead man's possessions are still considered his) sentences like
(1)-(2) are quite inappropriate----'Y'ersions with possessive pronouns are called
for (sentences (18)-(19) below). Tiiis fits in with the fact that a dead man is
not affected by what happens to his possessions. Yet PA-type constructions can
be used in reference to a dead person when the physical state of the corpse is
changed; the corpse is thereby affected. Thus (3) is still appropriate; the
dead man is affected by having his hand cut as much as a dead man can be
affected by anything.
Thus wherever PA is posited, ED's could occur, since the possessor can be
viewed as affected. In any situation in which an ED could not occur, because
the possessor is not affected, PA-type structures do not occur.
This is
entirely consistent with the theory that claims that these structures in fact
have ED's in them.
1.1.3.2

PA must occur where the possessor is clearly affected;
- it need not occurwhere the possessor is not clearly affected

To the extent that the conceptual situations represented in (1)-(3) can be
viewed as . not connoting that the possessor is affected by what is predicated
about this possession, those situations can also be represented by a non-PA-type
structure with no dative and with an overt possessor marking. Thus (18)-(20),
which parallel (1)-(3), are possible.
(18)

Ensuciaron

su

coche.

they:dirtied his car
'They got his car dirty.'
(19)

2Robaron

todo

su

dinero.

they:robbed all
his money
'They stole all his money.'
(20)

(2)Cortaron

su

mano.

they:cut his hand
'They cut his hand.'
(18) tends to imply that the person was not affected by his car's getting
dirty. It would be most appropriate if he were absent when the heinous offense
was perpetrated, or especially if someone else were using the car.
(19) is of un- or questionable grammaticality. I think this is because of
the semantics of robar; like the English rob, it tends to denote a crime against
a person (or a property-owning entity like a bank or the corner gas station)
rather than against property per se.
(Contrast with steal.) This victim is
usually coded (appropriately enough) by an ED. The victim need not be coded at
all, however; it is quite possible to say robaron tres ail pesos: 'they stole
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3000 pesos'. But if the possessor of the money is brought into the picture at
all it will be as the victim of the crime (coded by an ED) rather than as the
possessor of the property taken .13
It is for this reason that ( 19) is
anomalous.14

(20) will also be judged in vacuo by many Spanish speakers as
ungrammatical. I believe that this°IB because of the difficulty in conceiving
of a situation in which one is not affected by having one's hand cut.
That
brings us up to the issue of "inalienable possessions".
This is a somewhat
elastic class that at least involves as clear members body parts and clothing
which is being worn. It is often assumed that PA-type constructions like those
in (1)-(3) are obligatory with "inalienable possessions". If this were true,
(20) would be ungrammatical as a matter of course. It seems clear to me that
the "inalienability" of possessions can be translated into the probability that
the possessor will be affected by whatever happens to his possessions. Consider
for instance (21).
(21) a. Le
pis6
los zapatos.
DAT he:stepped:on the shoes
'He stepped on his (another's) shoes.'
b.Pis6

sue

zapatos.

he:stepped:on his shoes
'He stepped on his shoes.'
(21a) is appropriate when the possessor is wearing the shoes (in which case he
is almost certain to be affected by their being stepped on) and also in any
other situation in which he is viewed as affected. For instance, in recounting
a list of atrocities which A has committed against B, it would be quite apropos
to include (21a) even if B's shoes were in the closet when A stepped on them.
(21b) is not very appropriate if the shoes are being worn; - i t rather implies
that the possessor was not affected by their being stepped on. However, it is
quite appropriate when the shoes are sitting out in the middle of the floor or
in the closet and someone steps on them, because in such a situation the person
can easily be viewed as rtot affected by what happens to his shoes. In other
words, whenever the possessor can be viewed as not affected by the action of
stepping on the shoes, (21b) will be appropriate.
An even more interesting case is the sort of thing that happens with the
most "inalienable" possessions of all-.body parts. In at least two situations
what happens to a body part can be viewed as not affecting its possessor. Qne
is unconsciousness or inattention. Thus, (22b) is quite appropriate to say in
talking about the procedure followed in an operation.

(22) a. Le

abrieron

el

est6mago.

DAT they:opened the stomach
'They opened up his stomach.'
su
est6mago.
they:opened his stomach
'They opened up his stomach.'

b. Abrieron

(22a) is appropriate, because even an unconscious person can be viewed as
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affected by having his stomach cut open, but (22b) is also appropriate, because
as long as he is unconscious he is not directly or clearly affected by it as he
would be if he were conscious. Similar comments apply to (23a) and (23b).
(23) a. Una bala
one bullet
sin
without
b. Una

one

bala
bullet

sin
without

me

me:DAT
que
that

traspas6
passed:through

me
me:DAT

diera
!:give

traspas6
passed:through
que
that

me
me:DAT

mi
my

la
the

mano
hand

cuenta.
account
mano
hand

diera
!:give

cuenta.
account

'A bullet passed through my hand without my realizing it.'
The other case in which the possessor of a body part can be viewed as not
affected by what happens to the body part is dismemberment.
Thus if in an
accident a person's arm was cut off and was lying in the road getting run over
by the cars, he might well say (24b), but hardly (24a).
(24) a. Los

the
b. Los

the

coches me
cars
me:DAT
coches
cars

aplastaron
they:smashed

aplastaron mi
smashed
my

el
the

brazo.
arm

brazo.
arm

'The cars smashed my arm.'
(24a) and not (24b) would be appropriate if the cars smashed his arm while it
was still attached to him; i.e., when he was still clearly affected by what
heppens to it. A very similar case is that of teeth. While they are still in
one's mouth, he is usually affected by what happens to them, but when they have
been taken out, although they are still his teeth, he is not affected by what
happens to them. Thus (25a) is appropriate to use when speaking to a dentist,
but (25b) is much less appropriate in that situation, since the dental manner of
examining teeth usually has (adverse) effects upon the patient. However, once
the tooth has been extracted, and the patient is showing it to a friend, (25a)
is quite inappropriate and (25b) is called for.
(25) a. Mi:renae

look:at:me:DAT
b. Mire

look:at

mi
my

el
the

diente.
tooth

diente.
tooth

'Look at my tooth.'
In exactly the same way, ( 20) wi 11 be appropriate in cases of
unconsciousness or dismemberment, because the person can be viewed in those
circumstances as not affected by what happens to his hand, and (3) will be
inappropriate in cases of dismemberment, because the person can no longer be
vi~w-~d as affected by what happens to his hand.
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In sum, then, in situations where the possessor is perforce viewed as
affected by what happens to his possession (including the cases usually subsumed
under "inalienable possession"), the PA-type structure is required; the
structure with the possessor overtly marked and with no dative is inappropriate.
If the possessor can be optionally viewed as either affected or not affected,
either type of structure can optionally be used. Once again, these facts are at
the least entirely consistent with a theory that claims that the datives in PAtype structures are in fact ED' s marking the person affected by the action or
state predicated.
1.1.3.3

Ambiguous(~ vague) possession

Sentences (1)-(3) were glossed with the DAT translated as a possessor.
That is appropriate for most instances of those sentences. However, they may
also be used in certain situations in which the DAT cannot be translated as a
possessor. For example, (1) is quite appropriate when A's car is the one that
is dirtied and yet the DAT refers to B, as long as Bis affected. The sentence
would then have to be translated in English as They got the car dirty on him.
Similarly (2) would be quite appropriate if it was A's money but B was affected
by the stealing; say he was carrying the money at the time. The sentence would
be translated as They stole all the 1110ney from him, or They robbed him of all
the money.
In fact, (2) in the case where it is B's money could be
felicitiously translated as 'Ibey stole all his money from him. Even (3) can be
construed with the hand belonging to A and the dative referring to B, as long as
B is affected.
If it is already known that B was carrying A's hand around,
trying to protect it, (3) would be appropriate with some translation such as
They cut the hand on him..
This construal is quite odd, but that is simply
because it is odd to think of Bas the person affected by A's hand being cut.
Thus it is apparent that whenever a person other than the possessor can be
viewed as affected by a predication relative to the possession, the dative in
sentences like (1)-(3) can be interpreted as referring to the person.
This
parallels the case with ED's noted in the last paragraph of Section 1.1.2.
Notice too the parallel with the cases noted in Section 1.1 of PO where there
are no ED's. Once again, these facts are at the least consistent with the view
that the datives in PA-type structures are in fact ED's and that the possessors
are simply omitted rather than ascended.
1.1.3.4

Clear possession by another

It is quite possible to get sentences like (1)-(3) with the construal by
which the person represented by the dative is not the possessor, but in which
the real possessor is overtly marked. Thus (26)-(28), which parallel (1)-(3).
(26)

ensuciaron
tu
coche.
DAT they:dirtied your car
'They got your car dirty on him.'

Le
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(27)

Le
robaron
todo 1lli dinero.
DAT they:robbed all
my money
'They stole all my money from him.'

(28)

(7)Le
cortaron 1lli mano.
DAT they:cut my hand
'They cut my hand on him.'

(28) is quite odd, but again that is explainable by the fact that it is very
atypical for.! to be the person affected when A's hand is cut.
Once again, this is not the sort of thing that one would expect from PA,
but it is not at all surprising given the analysis of (1)-(3) as having ED's and
PO.

1.1.3.5 Possessive pronouns~ preverbal subjects
For most speakers the possessor must be omitted (or deleted) in sentences
like (4), (5), (7), (8) and (16), where PO (or PD) is clearly motivated. For
some speakers, however, the added proviso must be made that PO is often or even
usually suppressed when the possessed nominal is a preverbal subject.
(Actually, it may be that the important fact is that such a subject precedes the
other occurrence of the nominal understood as possessor in the clause. I think
that discourse considerations are involved here.)
For these speakers,
grammaticality judgments like the following hold.
(29) a. Su/UEl
his/the
b. Se

REFL

hijo
son

le auri6.
DAT he:died

se
REFL

le
111uri6
DAT he:died

hijo.
son

el/'l*su
the/his

(=(16))

'His son up and died on him.'
(30) a. Su/7El

his/the
b. Lo

ACC
Co

hijo
son

mat6
he:killed

Pue
he:was

lo
ACC

mat6.
he:killed

el/su
the/his

matado

por

killed

by

'His son killed himo I

hijo.
son
hijo.
son

el/su
the/his

(active and passive)

(31) a. Le
mandaron
el/7su hijo
DAT they:sent the/his son
'They sent his son to him.'

b. Su/7El
hijo le
fue
his/the son
DAT he:was
'His son was sent to him.'

mandado.
sent
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c. Le
fue
mandado el/su
DAT he:was sent
the/his
'His son was sent to him.'

hijo.
son

For these same speakers, a preverbal subject will retain its possessor in a PAtype situation as well. 'lbus (32)-(34), which parallel (1)-(3).
ensuciado.
dirtied

(32)

Su/?El
coche le
fue
his/the car
DAT it:was
'His car was gotten dirty.'

(33)

Todo su/tel
dinero le
fue
robado.
all
his/the money
DAT it:was stolen
'All his money was stolen (from him).'

(34)

Su/?La
aano le
fue
his/the hand DAT it:was
'His hand was cut.'

cortada.
cut

These facts fit in beautifully with the claim that the absence of the
possessives in both (1)-(3) and (29a), (30a), and (31a) is a result of PO. It
makes sense under that theory that the possessor should be specifiable under
exactly the same conditions in PA-type sentences as in other sentences. Once
again, then, the facts are at the least consistent with the theory that PA-type
sentences are to be accounted for by ED's together with Po.15
1.1.4

Summary and conclusion

In Section 1.1.1 it was shown that either PO or PD is needed to account for
certain facts in Spanish, and it was argued that PO is preferable.
It was
claimed that PO (or PD) can account for the fact that no overt possessor shows
In Section 1.1.2 it was
up in the sentences for which PA would be posited.
shown that ED's are needed to account for certain facts in Spanish. In Sections
1.1.3.1 to 1.1.3.3 it was argued that the behavior of the datives that would be
produced by PA is consistent with an analysis which posits that they are in fact
ED's. In Sections 1.1.3.3 to 1.1.3.5 data were given which showed that the
behavior of the possessors in PA-type sentences is consistent with an analysis
that posits that they are omitted rather than ascended.
I conclude that the independently motivated PO and the independently
motivated ED' s, working together, can account for the same facts as PA would.
Therefore Argument A, which claimed superiority for PA on the basis that it
would require no universally new types of RN's, is invalid. A theory positing
ED's and PO (henceforth ED-PO) also requires no universally new types of RN's
and accounts for the same facts.
1. 2

In answer to Argument B

Argument B for PA was that positing it allows one to reflect the similarity
in meaning between sentences like ( 1)-(3) and parallel sentences ( like the
English glosses) in languages without PA.
Argument B can show that PA is
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necessary only if (a) the assumptions underlying it are valid, and (b) there is
no alternative analysis that appropriately reflects the similarity in meaning
between sentences like (1)-(3) and their English glosses. In Section 1.2.1 I
will question the assumptions underlying Argument B, and in Section 1.2.2 I will
claim that an analysis with PD would do much the same thing as PA even if the
assumptions are valid.
1. 2 .1

Argument B's assumptions

~

questionable _!! not wrong

It seems to me that at least three assumptions underlie Argument B. They
are: ( i) Sentences like ( 1) and its English gloss are in fact the same in
meaning; that is, the meanings are identical with respect to the relevant
aspects, in particular the relationship of possession. (ii) This identity of
meaning must be reflected by an identity of structure at some linguistic level.
(iii) In fact, it should be represented at the initial syntactic level. I think
that all three assumptions can be questioned. Assumptions (i) and (ii) will be
hard to handle separately, so I will take them together first.
1.2.1.1
1. 2 .1.1.1

What

~

meaning?

Where is it represented?

Three meanings of "meaning"

It is by no means clear that sentence (1) and its English gloss mean the
same thing in the ways and to the extent necessary to sustain Argument B.
"Sameness of meaning" can be judged by.at least three criteria.
{i) In common parlance we say two expressions "mean" the same thing if they
are functionally equivalent in general.
In other words, do two expressions'
truth conditions coincide in most cases, or are they good translations for each
other in most contexts'Z If so, we say they "mean" the same thing. I will call
this the Functional Criterion. The distinctions this criterion makes are
obviously matters of degree and may be held for one situation or purpose but not
for another.
For some purposes and situations ball and sphere have the same
Functional "meaning", but ball will not do where geometric accuracy is
necessary, nor will sphere do in sports, especially American football.
( ii) A stricter test for identity of meaning is identity of truth
conditions .16
By this criterion ( the Truth-value Criterion) two expressions
"mean" the same thing if and only if they have exactly the same truth values
under all conditions. Ball differs in Truth-value "meaning" from sphere because
there are situations in which one of them is appropriate and the other is not:
it is true that an American football is a ball; it is not true that it is a
sphere.
{iii) What we will call the !magic Criterion makes more fine-grained
distinctions.
It has been pointed out that even when two expressions have
identical truth conditions they may still differ in "meaning" in some sense. It
is not the same to say Each of the men is a sailor as to say All of the men are
sailors, even though the truth conditions for the two sentences are identical.
To say that a bottle is half full and to say that it is half empty is to say
slightly different things about the amount of liquid in the bottle, even though
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the amount of liquid is the same. The two sentences "mean" something different
even though the difference in "meaning" is difficult to pin down. The nature of
the !magic Criterion will be discussed in Section 1.2.1.1.3.
"Meaning", then, as judged by the Functional or Truth-value Criterions, can
be (and. has been) viewed as essentially a function of truth conditions:
the
greater the extent to which the truth conditions of two expressions coincide,
the more felicitous it is to say that the expressions have the same "meaning".
The !magic Criterion, however, appeals to some notion of distinctions of
"meaning" that go beyond what is revealed by truth value judgments.
I would claim that sentence (1) and its English gloss (and the rest of the
PA-type sentences and their English glosses) "mean" the same thing only in the
sense implied by the Functional Criterion, not in the senses implied by the
Truth-value and !magic Criterions.

1.2.1.1.2

Different meanings by the Truth-value Criterion

If "meaning the same thing" means being functionally equivalent to a rather
high degree, as implied by the Functional Criterion, then it seems clear that
sentences like (1) and their English equivalents "mean" the same thing.
Most
situations (including the most common ones) about which you could felicitously
say Le ensuciaron el coche could also felicitously be reported by They got his
car dirty, and vice versa. But not quite all, as we saw in Section 1.1.3. For
instance, in 1.1.3.3 it was pointed out that sometimes Le ensuciaron el coctie
refers to a situation in which They got his car dirty is inappropriate (e.g.
when it is someone else's car), and one must instead say They got the car dirty
on him.. Also, as pointed out in the case of a dead man in Section 1.1.3.1, They
got his car dirty may be appropriate where Le ensuciaron el coche is not.
In
both cases there is a discrepancy in the truth conditions: it may be true that
Le ensuciaron el coche where it is not true that They got his car dirty• and
vice versa. Thus by the Truth-value Criterion the sentences do not "mean" the
same thing.
This in itself is probably enough to undermine Argument B.
The two
sentences differ in "meaning" on the questions of whether the referent of the
dative in the Spanish sentence must correspond to the possessor in the English
sentence, and whether the referent of the possessive in the English sentence can
always surface as a dative in Spanish.
PA would predict that both of these
questions would be answered affirmatively, but we see that neither of them can
be.
It might be countered that PA need not be the only source for sentences
like (1); i.e., that (1) is ambiguous rather than vague about who is the
possessor.
That is, the predictions of PA hold true, but only for a subset of
instances of ( 1); the other instances are derived · from a different source.
Since the Truth-value Criterion distinguishes "meaning" only where there is a
truth value discrepancy, it is possible (and even logical) to claim that in the
cases where there is no discrepancy the "meaning" is the same.
(Notice that
this contention can not be urged against the !magic Criterion distinctions I
claim in the next section, since !magic "meaning" distinctions hold even when
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truth values coincide.)
Argument B would then take the following form:
We
should posit PA because it allows us to reflect the similarity (=identity of the
relevant aspects) of meaning between those cases in which it applies and the
corresponding sentences in English (and other languages) in which it does not
apply. To sustain the argument, one would also have to posit that the English
glosses are also ambiguous between two kinds of possession. Thus the English
gloss for (1) would have one "meaning" which would be the same as that of (1) on
the reading where the possessor is coreferential with the DAT, and another which
would be different.
( One might suggest "affected possessor" versus "nonaffected possessor".) Rather than the identity of meaning between (1) and its
English gloss being at issue, it would be the identity of meaning between some
instances of (1) and some instances of their English counterparts.
This
certainly undermines the plausibility of Argument B.
Positing this double
ambiguity here is ad hoc and comes perilously close to being argument in a
circle: we decide that the sentences, both English and Spanish, are ambiguous,
because otherwise PA will not work, and we know that PA works because the
sentences are ambiguous.
As a further consideration, for what it's worth,
constructions with so did or and ••• too have been proposed (Lakoff 1970) as a
test for vagueness versus ambiguity.
These constructions, it is claimed, are
possible with different readings in the case of vagueness but not in the case of
ambiguity.17 Thus My uncle is a butcher and so is John's (or and John's is too)
is vague rather than ambiguous as to whether maternal or paternal uncles are
referred to, and therefore any reading is possible.
Both uncles may be
maternal, both paternal, or one of each. By contrast, in I like my /cBJ.ts/ and
John likes his too, /~nts/ is ambiguous between the aunts and the ants sense,
and therefore only those readings are possible where both John and I like the
same kind of /ai.ts/.
By this test both (1) and its English gloss are vague
rather than ambiguous:
(35)

A
mi me
ensuciaron
el
coche, y
a
Juan taabien.
OBJ me me:DAT they:dirtied the car,
and OBJ John too
'They got my/another's car dirty (on me) and John's/another's
( on John) too.'

(36)

They got my car dirty and John's too.
(Appropriate whether either~ both, or neither was affected.)

Similar results are obtained by applying the same test to (2) and (3) and other
PA-type sentences. Thus it seems not to be the case that these sentences are
ambiguous .18
It would appear, then, that sentences like (1) and the corresponding
English glosses do not "mean" the same thing in the sense required to support
Argument B, as judged by the Truth-value Criterion.
1.2.1.1.3

Different meanings by the !magic Criterion

The !magic Criterion is more sensitive than the Truth-value Criterion. By
the Truth-value Criterion we can judge that sentences like (1) differ in
"meaning" in those instances in which their truth values do not coincide. But I
am convinced that the sentences differ in another sense of "meaning" even in
those instances where their truth values do coincide. In other words, given (1)
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and its English gloss both making felicitous reference to the same situation, I
would claim that they are saying slightly different things about it, that in
fact they "mean", in the !magic sense, slightly different things.
It is not easy to characterize the sense in which the sentences "mean"
different things by the !magic Criterion, in part because there is no simple and
generally accepted test like similarity of truth conditions which will
distinguish the "meanings". Different notions of "meaning" have been appealed
to; I would not be at all surprised if what I refer to as the Imagic Criterion
is in fact a bag of different criteria capable of making finer distinctions than
those possible under the Functional and Truth-value Criterions.
Often such
criteria are lumped together under a heading of "Intuition". That is to some
extent enlightening; intuitive judgments are based on such distinctions in
meaning, and introspective examination of one's intuitions can often give a good
start on a characterization of what those distinctions are.
It was my
intuitions as a speaker of Spanish and English that convinced me that Argument B
was false, and indirectly led me to the writing of this paper. But of what do
such "intuitions" consist'l
Langacker (1979:88-89) speaks of differences in
conceptual viewpoint being conventionally coded by different semantic units
(including both unitary predicates and constructions), which represent different
"images" or views of the conceived referent. Thus The statue is on the pedestal
and The pedestal is under the statue, when applied to the same scene, represent
two different viewpoints on or images of that scene. Perhaps this is as good a
way as any to characterize the difference between the Truth-value Criterion and
the Imagic Criterion. Truth-value distinctions show that different scenes are
being referred to, while !magic distinctions claim that the same scene may be
being referred to, but that it is being construed differently, through a
different Image, from a different conceptual, social and/or emotional
perspective.19
I believe (and hope to illustrate, if not demonstrate, below) that the
!magic distinctions are primary over the Functional and Truth-value distinctions
in that they entail, and thus can be used to explain, the Functional and Truthvalue distinctions, but not vice versa.20 When two expressions view the same
scene through different images, it is often (though not necessarily always)
possible to imagine a scene which one of those images fits but the other does
not. To change the metaphor, you can usually find a scene on which one of the
two viewpoints is possible but the other is not.
This will amount to a
distinction by the Truth-value Criterion. In other words, once you know what
the expressions "mean" in the sense of the !magic Criterion, you will know where
and why the Truth-value distinctions will hold; but finding a Truth-value
distinction does not tell you automatically why it occurs, nor which !magic
distinction is responsible for it. Truth-value distinctions are just that tip
of the iceberg which truth-value judgments can make visible; they tell you
little about the shape of the iceberg as a whole. If Truth-value distinctions
occur often enough, they will amount to a Functional distinction: the two words
will not "mean" the same thing at all except perhaps in specific specialized
contexts.
I would also claim that !magic "meaning" is primary in that it can explain
similarities in Functional and Truth-value "meanings", but not vice versa.
!magic "meaning" not only can make distinctions too fine for the Truth-value
Criterion to reveal, but it can also make subtler semantic connections, showing
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similarities between expressions too different for the Functional Criterion to
show as "meaning" the same thing. An example of this sort of thing is involved
in the almost instantaneous grasping of many jokes.
Most people understand
They're called wisdom teeth because they smart the first time through. Involved
in that understanding is (among other things) the ability to perceive an
important semantic similarity between wisdom and one sense of smart. Yet it is
improbable that everyone who gets the joke has ever heard wise and smart or
wisdom and smartness used as functional substitutes. I do not remember hearing
them so used myself; I would as soon class them as antonyms as as synonyms.
Their truth values do not coincide except accidentally (the same person may be
both wise and smart, but then the same person may be both tall and cross-eyed)
and they are rarely if ever acceptable translations for each other.
Thus the
similarity between them is not a clear Functional similarity, and certainly not
a Truth-value identity.
Yet the similarity is clearly and easily perceived.
Such similarities are also crucial to an understanding of metaphor.
Whoever
first called a narrow part in the road a bottleneck was clearly responding to
Imagic similarities between two things clearly distinct by the Functional
criterion. Indeed, whoever first called a bottleneck a bottle neck was making a
similar response. The reason such metaphors catch on is that other speakers are
already aware of the !magic meanings of (in this case) bottle and neck, and can
see the appropriateness of naming a bottleneck by those words. Or consider the
words brother and sister. Clearly they have a lot in common !magically. This
common !magic material can be coded by sibling in academic dialects of English;
other dialects which do not have that word also perceive the similarity between
brother and sister.
Yet they are clearly not Functional equivalents: it is
difficult to find any case in which both are true or appropriate.
Again, we
have a clear Imagic similar! ty which does not correspond to a Fune tional
similarity. In many cases, however, such similarities will result in two
expressions' being alternative in some environment~in other words, a Functional
similarity of "meaning" will arise. There is at least one Imagic similarity to
account for every Fune tional similarity, but not vice versa; Functional
similarities are just another tip of the iceberg of !magic meaning.
If there
are enough such similarities (and no egregious dissimilarities) between two
expressions, a Truth-value similarity (or identity) will obtain.
Here we are more concerned with Imagic distinctions of meaning than with
similarities. While such distinctions are subtle and difficult to characterize,
they are very pervasive. They occur, of course, between every two expressions
that differ greatly in meaning, but in those cases they are often ignored (at
least by linguists) since the difference in "meaning" can be characterized by
the Functional Criterion or the Truth-value Criterion.
However, the need to
posit them shows up more clearly in the consideration of such phenomena as
language-internal synonymy and paraphrase and cross-language translation. It is
very difficult to find a synonym, paraphrase, or translation that does not
involve some difference in Imagic "meaning".
For instance, do the verbs gaze
and stare "mean" the same things'l
Do be quiet and shut up "mean" the same
thing'l
Are hors d'oeuvres and appetizers the same in "meaning"'l They are by
the Functional Criterion and possibly by the Truth-value Criterion, but not by
the Imagic Criterion.
Does John bought the dog from me "mean" the same as I
sold the dog to John'l Or, perhaps more controversially, does John hit me "mean"
the same as I was hit by John'l They apparently do by the Functional and Truthvalue criteria, but it is at least arguable that they differ by the !magic
Criterion.
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To return to a previous example, does half empty "mean" the same thing as
half full? They are clearly Functionally equivalent. They are apparently the
same in meaning even by the Truth-value Criterion--! have not been able to think
of any situation in which it is true that something is half full but not true
that it is half empty, nor vice versa. Certain infelicities do arise. It would
be rather odd to say about someone who was filling a glass with water, Be
stopped when it was half empty.21 Yet that oddness would not amount to a clear
violation of the Truth-value Criterion: it is still true that he stopped when
it was half empty.
However, I would claim that there is a clear !magic
difference between half eapty and half full.
Half empty locates a point by
!magic reference to a scale of emptiness, where one scans from full towards
empty.
Half full locates that same point on a scale of fullness, where one
scans from empty towards full.
Any point between empty and full can be
specified by reference to either scale.
That is why three-fourths full can
refer to the same point as one-quarter empty, or one-quarter full to the same
point as three-quarters empty. To get at the same Image in a slightly different
way, half full !magically measures the amount of liquid in the container,
whereas half eapty !magically measures the empty space above the liquid. This
accounts for the infelicity noted above; when a glass is being filled the
direction of scanning most naturally goes with the movement of the liquid, from
empty towards full.
To say half empty in such a situation practically forces
one to scan from both directions at once, for no good purpose, with odd or
humorous sounding results.
Similarly, does the expression four plus one "mean" the same as the
expression five?
(Or does seven minus two, or ten divided by two?) They are
functional equivale~ts in some sense, and it is difficult if not impossible to
find a case in which one is true and the other not. Yet they differ !magically
in that four plus one arrives by a complicated route at a conceptual situation
comparable to the one achieved directly by five.
The same number is being
referred to, but in two different !magic ways.
Or, to take a cross-linguistic case, is the Spanish sentarse ( seat :REFL)
the same in "meaning" as the English sit down? Does acostarse (lay:REFL) "mean"
the same as lie down? They are functionally equivalent in most situations, and
thus "mean" the same by the Functional Criterion.
The Truth-value Criterion
differentiates between them, however, in a few instances •. ·consider the case of
a person lying on a couch, who then assumes a seated position on the couch.
Here sentarse is appropriate to describe the action but sit down is not; sit up
is called for.
Note that there is no parallel case to distinguish between
acostarse and lie down; either expression is appropriate to describe a person
assuming a prone position, no matter what his previous position was.
Or
consider the case of an action of forcing a physically resisting child into a
seated or lying position.
It is appropriate to say I made hi• sit (or lie)
down,22
but it is not appropriate to say Le hice sentarse (DAT I :made
seat:REFL) or Le hice acostarse (DAT !:made lay:REFL). These sentences would be
appropriate if psychological rather than physical pressure were used. But for
cases of physically forcing the child to sit or lie down, Lo sente (ACC
I: seated) or Lo acoste (ACC I: laid) are called for.
Thus by the Truth-value
Criterion acostarse and lie down don't "mean" the same things, nor do sentarse
and sit down.
Sentarse and sit down are differentiated by the Truth-value
Criterion in two cases, but acostarse and lie down are differentiated in just
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one of those cases. However, I would claim that by the !magic Criterion both of
these Spanish expressions differ from their .English glosses in exactly the same
way.
There is inherent in the conception of a prototypical act of sitting or
lying down a notion of departure from the canonical vertical orientation of
human posture.
I would claim that that notion is represented in the semantics
of the English forms but not in the semantics of the Spanish forms.
In other
words, there is an !magic distinction between the English and the Spanish forms
at this point.
This distinction is coded by the presence of the word down in
English and the absence of any such word in Spanish.23 This !magic distinction
happens to result in a Truth-value distlnction between sentarse and sit down.
because some acts of sitting result in an approximation to, rather than a
departure from, the canonical vertical posture. Those acts must be coded by sit
up. The fact that there is no similar Truth-value distinction between acostarse
and lie down is explained by the "meaning" {!magic sense) of lie:
it is
difficult if not impossible to conceive of a situation in which assuming a
horizontal posture leads one to a more rather than a less close approximation to
the canonical vertical posture. Titus there is no English expression lie up in
opposition to lie down. {Similarly there is no stand down in oppostion to stand
up.) Also inherent in the prototypical conception of sitting or lying down is a
notion of reflexivity.
When one sits or lies down one does something that
affects the sta.te of one's body.
I would claim that that notion is not
represented in the semantics of the English form but that it is in the Spanish.
It is coded by the use of reflexive forms of the transitive verbs sentar
{'seat') and acostar {'lay'). This Imagic distinction can lead to a Truth-value
distinction in certain cases in which one's body achieves the specified state
{seated or prone) without one's doing anything to cause it (e.g. the case
discussed above of child being physically forced to sit or lie down). The fact
that Le hice sentarse/a.costarse can be used when psychological rather than
physical pressure is employed is explained: in such circumstances the child is
still seating himself {or laying himself down) even if under duress.
Thus it
appears that the occurrence and nature of the Truth-value distinctions can be
explained by the occurrence and nature of the !magic differences, though not
vice versa.
I think that the case with (1) and its English gloss {and the other PA-type
sentences and their glosses) is similar.
The two are often functionally
equivalent, thus "meaning" the same in terms of the Functional Criterion. As we
have seen, the Truth-value Criterion distinguishes between them in certain
cases. Yet even when they refer to identical conceptualizations as far as the
Truth-value Criterion shows us, I would claim that they have different
"meanings" in the sense of the !magic Criterion. The semantics of the English
sentence contains a reference to possession, which is coded explicitly by a
possessive pronoun his; I would claim that the semantics of the Spanish sentence
does not contain such a reference.
This explains why the identity of the
possessor is vague in the Spanish sentences; it is simply not specified.
It
also accounts for the Truth-value distinctions where Le ensuciaron el coche is
true {appropriate) but They got his car dirty is not because it is not his car.
The semantics of the Spanish sentence, on the other hand, contains a reference
to a person's being affected by the action of the car being dirtied, whereas the
semantics of the English sentence does not.
This reference in the Spanish
sentence is coded by the presence of an ED.
Positing this !magic distinction
accowits for the fact that the English sentence is vague as to the extent to
which the possessor {or anyone else) was affected by the dirtying of the car •
.,
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It also accounts for the Truth-value distinctions where They got his car dirty
is true (appropriate) while Le ensuciaron el coche is not, because he was not
affected by the dirtying of his car (being e.g., dead). Positing these !magic
distinctions is entirely consistent with the Functional equivalence of the
sentences:
they are equivalent precisely because in the prototypical or most
common cases the possessor and the person affected are the same.
Thus these
cases can be viewed through either Image.
Thus it would appear that by the !magic Criterion all instances of (1) and
its English gloss differ in "meaning" precisely in that the English sentence
specifies possession whereas the Spanish one does not, and the Spanish sentence
specifies that someone is affected whereas the English one does not. Similar
considerations show the same to be true of (2) and (3) and other PA-type
sentences with respect to their English glosses. Thus it makes sense to claim
that these meaning distinctions are properties of the constructions, not just of
the individual pairs of sentences.
English speakers use a construction which
specifies possession but leaves affectedness vague; Spanish speakers use a
construction which specifies affectedness but leaves possession vague. English
speakers, of course, are aware that very often a possessor is affected by what
happens to his possessions, and similarly Spanish speakers are aware that very
often the person affected by what happens to a possession is its possessor. But
in each case the sentences they use do not code those notions explicitly but
rather leave them vague.
Thus it would appear to be clear that PA-type sentences and their English
glosses do not "mean" the same thing in the sense required to support Argument
B.
1.2.1.1.4

Where.!! identity of "meaning" representedZ

Another way to get at the same problem is to inquire whether the identity
of "meaning" between sentences like (1) and its English gloss is a linguistic
identity at all. I do not think that it is. Linguistically the sentences are
similar in various ways.
There are parallel semantic entities with sometimes
parallel semantic relationships, such as, for sentence (1), the agent TIIEY and
the patient CAR which is semantically definite, both related to the action DIRTY
(or CAUSE-INCHOATIVE-DIRTY, if you like) occurring in PAST time, and a 3 PERS SG
entitity somehow involved.
There are parallel syntactic phenomena and even
parallel phonological phenomena.
Yet though these parallels exist, I would
claim that they do not amount to identity, but only to similarity. And I would
claim that the differences include precisely those that most fit in with the EDPO hypothesis; namely, that the semantically involved 3 PERS SG is involved as
possessor in the English sentence and as affected person in the Spanish
sentence, and that the nominal representing that 3 PERS SG is syntactically a
(surface) possessive in English and an ED in Spanish.24
It seems to me that
the only identity that there is between the sentences is a sort of conceptual
identity which is not really linguistic in nature, though the ability to
perceive it is deeply involved in the use of language. We have the ability to
perceive that both sentences "fit" many of the same conceptual scenes just as we
have the ability to see that two different paintings may "fit" the same
landscape, or that different views of a face or the back of a head may "fit" the
same person, or that both G7 and n7 chords may, in certain contexts, "fit" the
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idea of a
including
specifies
specifies
1.2.1.2

dominant seventh. But I would claim that at every linguistic level,
semantic levels, the two sentences differ because the English one
possession whereas the Spanish one does not, and the Spanish one
that someone is affected whereas the English one does not.

~

possession in PA sentences.! syntactic thing2

Even if it is wrong to claim that (1) and its English gloss are different
at all linguistic levels, it is not at all clear that they are syntactically to
be viewed as having identical structures with respect to possession. I know of
no syntactic arguments for assigning initial Poss arcs to the DAT nominals in
PA-type sentences.
Such syntactic evidence is crucial; cf. the discussion in
Section 3.3. Thus .even if the sentences were semantically the same, that would
not be sufficient to argue that they are syntactically the same with respect to
possession, as we would have to posit were Argument B to have any validity.
1.2.1.3

Conclusion

I conclude that it is very doubtful (in fact it seems wrong to me to claim)
that sentences like (1)-(3) and their English glosses are equivalent in meaning
in the sense required for Argument B, and that even if they were, there is no
clear reason why that equivalence should be represented in the syn tac tic
structures of the languages. I thus conclude that Argument Bis invalid.
1.2.2

Argument.!!_ does not exclude PD

Even if all the questions raised in the preceding section with respect to
assumptions (i)-(iii) were settled in favor of what Argument B demands, Argument
B would still not show that PA is necessary. It would constitute an argument
for PA as against PO, or for PD as against PO, but it would not distinguish
between PA and PD, since both of them represent the similarity in meaning with
respect to the possessive relationship between the Spanish and the English
sentences in exactly the same way.25 So a model with PD and ED's would still be
on a par with a PA model.
Thus, even if the assumptions underlying it were
valid, Argument B would fail to prove that PA is necessary.
1.3

Conclusion

On the basis of the material presented in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, I conclude
that both Argument A and Argument Bare invalid • . In the absence of any further
arguments for PA, I further conclude that PA is therefore not necessary in
Spanish.
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2.

ED-PO is preferable to PA in Spanish
----

In this section are presented arguments to the effect that ED-PO is
superior to PA in accounting for the relevant facts of Spanish.
The first
argument to be presented is an argument from simplicity.
The second through
fifth arguments derive from the data presented in Section 1.1.3. The second is
an argument from the behavior of the datives in sentences like (1)-(3).
The
third and fourth arguments involve ways in which the superficially non-existent
possessors in these sentences behave as if they are omitted rather than
ascended. The fifth argument involves the fact that possessors can be overtly
marked in PA-type and non-PA-type sentences under exactly the same
circumstances.
The final argument is the converse of Argument B:
ED-PO is
preferable to PA because it adequately represents the differences in meaning
between sentences like ( 1) and its English gloss, whereas PA obscures those
differences.
2.1.

A theory of Spanish without PA is simpler

This argument is very simple.
ED' s and PO (or PD) are motivated within
Spanish quite apart from sentences like (1)-(3). PA, on the other hand, is not
independently motivated within Spanish. So why do we need itl A theory without
it is preferable to a theory with it, by Occam's razor.
2.1.1

A digression~ the universal availability of grammatical devices

Although the argument is basically simple, it appears that the terrain has
been confused by claims that if a device is universally available, then it costs
the grammar of a particular language nothing in terms of simplicity to utilize
it. I believe that such claims are misleading, if not erroneous. The following
is a summary of how I think such claims should be evaluated.
Given two devices A and B which equally well account for a range of data in
language X, and given that Ai.s independently attested in X, while Bis is not,
there are-four logical possibilities:
(i) If both A and B are universally available, I claim that a theory which
uses A to explain the data is preferable to one that has recourse to B. Thus,
any theory that would explain English data in terms of some clearly-attested
English phenomenon such as SVO word order is to be preferred over a theory which
would explain the same data in terms of say a Modalis Case marking 2-Chomeurs
(which is attested in Eskimo, and therefore universally available). (This is,
at least as far as this argument goes, the sort of situation we are dealing with
here; both PA and ED-PO are universally available, but only ED-PO is
independently attested in Spanish. However, in the next sections, I will argue
that actually ED-PO also accounts for the data better than PA.)
(ii)
If A is universally available while _! is not, then A is obviously
superior.
(iii) The opposite case, where A is not universally available while Bis,
never occurs. Any time a device A is-really clearly attested in language X, it
is by definition universally available; the test for universal availability is
clear attestation in some language.
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(iv) Similarly, the case where neither A nor! is universally available,
never occurs.
If ( as is given) A is clearly attested in the language
independent of the data in question, it is ipso facto universally available.
Thus, if the preceding judgments are accepted, any time there is a choice
between two devices, one of which is independently attested within the language
in question and the other of which is not, and both of which account equally
well for the same range of data, the independently attested one is preferable,
irrespective of which of them may or may not be universally available.
The question of universal availability only comes up as a factor in the
following few cases, as far as I can see.
(v) A and B both cover the same language X data equally well; neither of
them is independently motivated within X; A is not universally available (i.e.
attested in other languages) but B is:- In this case B is preferable to A.
(This is the only clear case where universal availabilityEihould cast a deciding
vote.)
-(vi)
A and B both cover the same language X data equally well; both of
them are independently motivated within X; A is not attested in other languages
(though it is, of course, universally available) but Bis. This might provide a
very weak argument for preferring B over A. Actually, in a case like this it
might even be better to claim that both Band A should be appealed to to account
for the data (cf. Hankamer 1977).
(vii) A covers a range of data in X better (e.g. more elegantly) than B.
A is not universally available (Le., attested in other languages) but B is.
Neither A nor B is independently motivated within x.
Here it seems that a
judgment needs to be made, based on the degree to which and in which sense A
handles the data better than B. If A very clearly handles the data better than
B, then that amounts to clear~ttestation for A, at which point A is universally
available, and clearly to be preferred over B.- Its lack of attestation in other
languages should be irrelevant. But if A is only very slightly or not clearly
better than B, then perhaps B would be preferable. Making such a decision is
tantamount t<>putting one's faith in the underlying unity of human language, and
implying that if we understood things better, the superiority of A over B would
be seen to be illusory.
2.2

The datives in PA sentences are ED's

---- -- -- ----- -- ---

It was claimed in Section 1.1.2 that the datives in PA sentences behave
like ED' s in the following ways: they may occur wherever the understood
possessor (let us call him Y) may be viewed as affected by the predicated action
or state; they need not oc~r where Y need not be viewed as affected, they must
occur wherever Y must be viewed as affected and they must not occur wherever Y
must not be viewed as affected. If these claims are true, it would seem clear
that those datives are in fact ED's.
·
This can be reduced to an argument from simplicity of the following form:
A theory with PA would need two extra constraints, one guaranteeing that PA will
occur where the possessor is viewed as affected, and another guaranteeing that
PA will not occur where the possessor is not viewed as affected.
Under the
theory that claims that the PA sentences have ED's in them, these facts are an
automatic consequence. ED's code the notion "(person) affected", and thus an ED
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will appear to represent Y whenever Y is viewed as affected, and will not appear
when he is not viewed -as affected.
Thus ED-PO does not need the extra
constraints, and it therefore is preferable.
To put the same argument in yet another form, a theory saying that a
possessor is coded by a dative if and only if it is viewed as affected is simply
a notational variant of one that claims that that dative "means" affectedness.
Any time a morpheme or construction occurs if and only if a given semantic
specification holds, we say that it "means" that specificaction. Thus PA would
be claiming, in effect, that the datives it produces have the same meaning as
ED's. These datives, however, are not ED's, because they come from a different
source.
Thus PA has two sources for datives with exactly similar meanings,
whereas ED-PO has only one source for those datives.
In this way ED-PO is
simpler and to be preferred.
Also, PA would be claiming that the semantic
relation of "( person) affected" corresponds to a GRx in some cases, but not in
others, whereas ED-PO can claim that that notion always corresponds to a GRx in
Spanish. Thus ED-PO is again simpler and to be preferred.
2.3.

The possessors in PA sentences~ omitted, not ascended

As the data presented in Section 1.1.3.3 show, the possessors in PA-type
sentences act more like they are omitted or never specified than like they are
ascended.
The possessor is usually the same as the person affected, but not
always.26
Imagine such a fact being true of any ascension, e.g., Subject
Raising in English. If such were the case, John seems to be tired would be able
to bear a meaning where Aloysius is the one who is tired, or He expects John to
put his foot in his mouth could mean that George or Mehetabel or someone else is
expected to put someone's foot in his mouth. I do not think that anyone would
ever have proposed raising if such facts had obtained. However, where something
is simply omitted and is never present linguistically, such vagueness is to be
expected.27 For instance, consider (12), where the possessor is omitted, or a
sentence like I hit hia, where it is usually assumed in vacuo that the
instrument of hitting is the hand but where it could perfectly well be a stick
or even a car. Or consider I bought a Ferrari yesterday, where the benefactee
is left vague; it will be assumed in vacuo that it was bought for the speaker
but it could perfectly well have been bought for someone else. It thus seems
clear that what is going on in sentences like (1)-(3) is omission rather than
ascension.
This can be reduced to an argument from simplicity very similar to that in
Section 2.1.
The PA theory is going to need two devices to account for the
absence of an overt possessor in (1)-(3); PA itself for those cases where the
DAT is the same person as the possessor, and some form of PO or of PD (perhaps
fed by PA) for the cases where the DAT is not the same person as the possessor.
ED-PO, however, needs only PO to account for all the cases.
Thus ED-PO is
simpler and to be preferred.
A related argument is the following: as we have just seen, PA will have to
posit the PA structure for cases of (1) which have coreferentiality of the DAT
and the understood possessor, and some other structure for those cases which do
not have that coreferentiality. I will assume (following usual practice within
RG) that those structures would differ at the initial stratum. In fact I would
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expect that in one structure the referent of the DAT would be marked as initial
Possessor, while in the other one it would not be so marked. I will further
assume that different initial syntactic structures reflect different semantic
structures, again following usual practice within RG. Under these assumptions,
the fact that PA would have to use different syntactic structures would predict
ambiguity rather than vagueness of possessorhood in the semantics of sentences
like ( 1). Some instances of (1) would have one semantic structure and others
would have a quite distinct one. ED-PO, however, predicts vagueness rather than
ambiguity, since all instances of (1) come from one initial structure, and
possession is never specified. As shown in Section 1.2.1.1.2 by sentence (35)
(1) is vague rather than ambiguous by the and so did ••• test.
Since the
predictions of ED-PO rather than those of PA are borne out, ED-PO is preferable.
The PA theory is also going to need two devices to account for the DAT in
sentences (1)-(3): PA when the possessor and the DAT's are the same, and ED's
or some such thing to account for the other cases. ED-PO can account for all
the cases with only ED's. Again ED-PO is simpler and to be preferred.
2.4

Possessors~ appear overtly in otherwise PA-type sentences

ED-PO is also supported by the fact that the possessors need not be omitted
but can in fact be specified, as the data in Section 1.1.3.4 show.
If PA is
posited for these sentences, we have no explanation for why the possessors
remain as possessors. Again, think what it would mean to posit this for another
ascension.
It would mean that by Subject Raising you could get English
sentences like *John seems for Aloysius to be tired, or *Be expects John for
Mehetabel to put his foot in his mouth. Again, I do not think that anyone would
have posited Raising in English if such facts obtained. However, when an item
is simply omitted, it is not at all surprising to find that it can be specified
if desired. For instance, contrast (12) with Put it in your mother's fridge, or
contrast I hit him with I hit. him with a noodle, or I bought a Ferrari yesterday
with I bought a Ferrari for my grandmother yesterday. Thus it appears that we
are dealing with an omission rather than an ascension.
Again, this can be reduced to an argument from simplicity; for these cases
a theory with PA is going to need something like ED' s to account for the
presence of the DAT, plus a constraint prohibiting PA from applying.
ED-PO,
however, need say nothing other than that it is permissible to include rather
than omit the possessor when it is desirable (and non-red\llldant). And even this
statement is exactly what we should expect; it is probably a universal of
language in some sense that one is permitted to specify items left vague when it
is desirable and does not contradict the norms of the language. Thus ED-PO is
simpler and more preferable.
2.5

PA would be suspended exactly where PO is

As shown in ( 2 9)-(31) (Section 1.1.3. 5), PO is suspendable for some
speakers in preverbal subjects; the possessor, even though coreferential with a
term nominal in the main clause, may be overtly specified in this position.
Under either the ED-PO or the PA grammars some statement of this fact will be
needed. As (32)-(34) show, the same pattern holds for sentences of the PA type:
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when the possessed nominal is a preverbal subject, its possessor may be overtly
specified.
Under the PA grammar this is a new kind of pattern.
A separate
statement would be needed that PA need not occur from preverbal subject
position, but that instead a coreferential dative may be put into the clause
( for no particular reason). Alternatively, a new process of Copy-PA might be
proposed, to occur only from preverbal subjects and after which PA could not
apply.
However it is done, complication is entailed.
Under the ED-PO model,
however, the independently needed statement accounts for the same facts without
any complications. In this way ED-PO is simpler than PA and to be preferred to
it.
2.6

PA obscures semantic differences

In Section 1.2.1 it was argued that the constructions represented by PAtype sentences like (1)-(3) and their English glosses differ semantically in
that the English construction specifies possession but leaves affectedness
vague, whereas the Spanish construction specifies affectedness but leaves
possession vague. These systematic differences in the semantics are admirably
represented by ED-PO, which has an ED specifying affectedness but no
specification of possession in Spanish.
(Both models would presumably have a
Poss arc but no ED in English.) PA, on the other hand, has an initial Poss arc
in the structure of the Spanish sentence with a specific nominal heading it.
This corresponds to no semantic relationship at all. Its presence argues
against PA. PA also has no GR coding affectedness in the initial stratum in the
Spanish sentences. If, as if often tacitly if not explicitly assumed, the only
articulation of semantics with syntax in RG is at the initial strattUn, this lack
also counts against the PA model. Thus the PA model for Spanish both implies
specific possession, and does not imply, under certain assumptions,
affectedness. Both of these implications obscure the semantics of the Spanish
sentences.
To put the same argument in another form, under ED-PO the link-up between
the semantic and syntactic structures will be simple and direct, whereas under
PA extra and ad hoc machinery will need to be added in order to make the
linking. Thus ED-PO is simpler and to be preferred.
2.7

Conclusion

I therefore conclude that ED-PO is clearly preferable to PA for accounting
for Spanish sentences like (1)-(3).
3. Implications
If the conclusions of the preceding sections are accepted, they have
important implications. First, they imply that other analyses using PA should
be re-examined.
Secondly, they imply that the relationship of semantics to
syntax had better be re-examined and certain practices of syntactic research and
argumentation severely questioned if not abandoned.
Thirdly, they have
implications for translation theory. These topics will be addressed briefly in
the following sections.
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3.1

What about PA in other languagesZ

If the foregoing argumentation is valid, there is in Spanish a construction
which at first glance looks very much like a PA construction but which on
further examination turns out not to be one. A clear practical consequence is
this:
there is at least one universally available close look-alike to PA.
Analyses using PA should therefore be closely examined to determine whether PA
is needed or whether an analysis along the lines of ED-PO is equally viable.
Perhaps it is the case that all, or certain kinds of, PA analyses that have been
proposed are better explained by something analogous to ED-PO.
I will discuss
these possibilities vaguely and briefly in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.

3.1.1

PA is undesirable universally

PA is undesirable universally for at least two reasons. One is simply that
it is an extra device. We could say that universal grammar would be simpler if
it did not have to contain a description of PA as a universally available GR
configuration.
Another way to say the same thing is that if PA were nonexistent we could make universal grammar stronger by being able to make the
generalization that possessors do not ascend.
We would be able to cross off
another item from the list of ways languages differ.
Another reason why PA is undesirable universally is that it violates two
proposed universals: the Relational Succession Law and the Host Limitation Law
(Perlmutter and Postal, to appear (b)).
The Relational Succession Law states
that when an ascension takes place, the ascendee assumes the GR of its Host (the
structure out of which it ascends). Thus a nominal which ascends from within a
1 will be a 1 upstairs, or a nominal which ascends from a 2 will be a 2
upstairs. This Law would be violated in Spanish by sentences like (1)-(3) if PA
were posited for them, and it is ·1riolated in the analyses that have been
proposed using PA in Tzeltal and Georgian and French (at least) (Aissen 1979,
Harris 1976, Frantz 1979). The Host Limitation Law states that only Terms (l's,
2 's, or 3' s) can serve as Hosts.
This Law would be violated by Spanish
sentences like (37) if they were accounted for by PA.
(37)

Le
cayeron
tres
gotas en la manga.
DAT they:fell three drops on the sleeve
'Three drops fell on his sleeve.'

The Host Limitation Law is also violated by the analysis posited using PA in
Georgian.
Both of these Laws can be modified fairly easily to apply only to
ascensions from clauses (i.e., all well-known ascensions other than PA)•
However, it would be preferable from a universal perspective if PA could be
shown to be unnecessary or if it could be shown that the only real cases of PA
are those that do not violate the universals, which then could be allowed to
stand in their more general form.
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3.1.2.

PA may be unnecessary universally

I find it hard not to feel that PA is probably not really needed in the
other languages for which it has been posited. I do not know the data in any of
those languages in any depth, so I speak in ignorance and am ready to be
corrected. But it seems to me very probable that some model similar to the EDPO model might handle those cases as well.
I am aware that not all of those
languages will have something exactly like ED's, and also that some of them do
have PA-type structures in places where ED' s could not occur.
For instance,
Perlmutter (personal communication) says that in Rumanian the parallel to (17)
is grammatical, as it is in Southern Tiwa.
Yet it seems to me that those cases might be able to be handled by positing
some GRy which instead of coding "(person) affected by the action or state
predicated" would code some more tenuous or less specific semantic connections,
such as "(person) with reference to whom the predication occurs".
This GR
could advance to 3 for those languages with PA to 3, or to the GR of the nominal
by virtue of which the person is referred to for languages with PA by the
Relational Succession Law.
PO (or PD) would be necessary to complete the
picture.
Frantz (personal communication) says that he
(or for) such a solution for Southern Tiwa. It is
in Chamorro (Crain 1979) sentences for which PA
have a semantic relationship of "in spite of"
putative ascendee.
In this case I would posit
semantic relationship.

knows of no evidence against
also interesting to note that
has been proposed apparently
between the clause and the
a GRy corresponding to that

Not knowing the other languages, I do not know what evidence can be found
independently in them which would support such proposals or militate against
them.
I also do not know how to evaluate the difference in universal terms
between a model which makes a configuration like PA available and one which
instead allows a new GRy•
If this approach could be made to work, however, it
would make the relationship between languages like Spanish and these others
clearer; they would differ only in the degree of involvement necessary
conceptually for a nominal to qualify to be coded by GRx or GRy•
At the least I feel that pursuing the possibility of explaining PA-type
structures by means of a model similar to the ED-PO model is likely to be a
fruitful field for investigation.

3.2

Implications for practical syntactic analysis

It has been quite common practice since the mid 1960' s for syntax to be
done following a sort of rule of thumb that when two expressions are paraphrases
of each other, they should be given identical deep or initial structures and the
difference in their form should be explained syntactically if possible.
The
assumption is that the paraphrase relationship indicates that the two
expressions have essentially the same meaning, and positing identical initial
structures will reflect this fact, simplifying the link-up between semantics and
syntax.
In particular, this strategy has been common in Relational Grammar.
Thus Frantz (1979:30) gives the reasoning behind a PA analysis of Stoney data as
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follows: "We can account for the paraphrase relation of these two sentences, as
well as their structural differences, by saying that [ the second] involves
ascension of the possessor .....
This study is by no means the first to deprecate such practice, nor the
first to point to what I believe to be the proper alternative (see e.g.
Langacker 1976, 1980). But the facts and arguments here presented do, it seems
to me, show at least one case where such an analysis is clearly wrong; where
even though there is a paraphrase relation between two constructions they have
different semantic structures and should be given different initial syntactic
structures. This means that some different way of accounting for the paraphrase
relationship is necessary. I think that such a way is provided by a proper view
of the complexity of !magic meaning and of the conceptual ability of humans to
view a situation through more than one Image.
If, as I have suggested and
strongly believe to be tr~e, paraphrases differ !magically more often than not,
this way of accounting for paraphrase will be the ordinary one; cases with
identical semantic structures will be the exception rather than the rule, and
the burden of proof will be on anyone who would claim that any case of
paraphrase is to be accounted for by an identity of semantic structures.
If the paraphrase relationship can and usually does exist with different
semantic structures, what reason is there to suppose that it will require
identical (initial) syntactic structuresl I would judge that there is no reason
to suppose it, and that therefore it would be more practical to assume that
where there is a difference in surface form it is more likely than not to
correspond to some difference in semantic and initial syntactic form.

3.3

Implications for Syntactic Argumentation

Quite apart from the practical question of which strategy is more likely to
lead to insightful analyses is the question of what is necessary in
argumentation to support an analysis once it has come to mind.
A weakness in
many RG analyses has been that initial relations have been claimed with little
or no argumentation to support them.
This is in part because it is quite
difficult to find syntactic arguments for many proposed initial relations, and
also in part because analysts rest on the assumption that similar semantic
relations will link up with similar GR's cross-linguistically.
Thus Frantz
( 1979: 1) speaks of analysts having "come to expect a fairly straightforward
correlation between the semantic role of a nominal and its syntactic function,"
and of "the claim that there are fairly straightforward principles for assigning
(initial) grammatical relations on the basis of semantic notions such as agency,
recipiency, affect, etc."
Or Perlmutter and Postal (1977:402) speak of
grammatical "relations as given cross-linguistic substance (in part) by
universal connections between the relational signs 1, 2, etc., and some
representation of semantic relations."
Indeed, Frantz (1979:67) lists as a
Principle of RG the "Universal! ty of initial termhood: initial GR' s are
predictable from semantic relations ... That this is necessarily the case is far
from clear, however.
Consider cases like buy vs. sell, which (according to
Perlmutter, personal communication) are probably best viewed as encoding the
same basic semantic material, but having the semantic relations linked to
different initial GR's. Or consider the case of many American Indian languages
which have no clear language-internal evidence of a GR of 3 (Indirect Object),
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but instead apparently code the nominals which correspond to 3's in other
languages as 2's (see e.g. Comrie 1979, Tuggy 1979a, 1979b). The whole problem
of exactly how to link up the semantics with the (initial) GR's has not to my
knowledge been worked out in any detail within RG; that is one aspect of the
theory that is in dire need of development. It is true that most other theories
are also deficient in this respect, but for at least some of them it is not as
crucial because they are not positing such abstract initial relations and can
give clear syntactic evidence for the more superficial relations they do posit.
To this problem must be added the problem presented in this paper of !magic
distinctions in meaning which are easily missed or glossed over when working in
a foreign language (or even one's own~), and which cast strong doubt on whether
the semantic relationships themselves are actually the same from language to
language, much less the syntactic relationships which depend more or less
"straightforwardly" on them.
The resultant picture should make it clear that
strong syntactic argumentation to establish initial GR' s is quite crucial in
arguing for RG analyses. If you cannot be sure that the semantic relations are
the same, nor that they will always correspond to the same initial syntactic
relations, you will need pretty strong evidence beyond a correlation with
intuitively likely semantic roles to establish an initial structure different
from the final one. Unless such evidence is available, any such analysis will
be dubious.
3.4

Implications for translation theory

Another area in which the argumentation of this paper and the notion of
!magic distinctions in meaning is relevant is the theory of translation. Much
has been said about translation under the assumption that it is essentially
possible; that one can
convey all and only the meaning of a message in a
source language by a translation in a receptor language.
Thus Beelanan and
Callow (1974: 20) define the task of translation as "to communicate the meaning
of the original", and they quote with approval Hollander's (1959:207) dictum
that, viewed customarily and com.mon-sensically, "to translate a sentence from
one language to another is somehow to discover its meaning and then to construct
a sentence in the new. or target language that possesses the same meaning. "28
The idea is that the two languages will have the same meaning structures; one
must exegete the source expression to arrive at the meaning and use the grammar
of the receptor or target language to construct the form appropriate to that
meaning in that language.
Translation is possible because the two languages
will have identical meaning structures.
This study would indicate that. this is not always the case; rather it
suggests (and my personal experience corroborates) that it is rarely if ever the
case. !magic distinctions in meaning are so pervasive and so subtle that it is
virtually impossible to translate any stretch of speech longer than a few
morphemes from one language to another without making some change in some facet
of some Image, winding up saying slightly different things in the different
languages.
I am obviously not the first to notice this: compare Nida' s
"No translation in a receptor language can be the exact
( 1959: 13) comment:
equivalent of the model in the source language. That is to say, all types of
translation involve (1) loss of information, (2) addition of information, and/or
( 3) skewing of information."
I most heartily agree.
It is almost always
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impossible to capture in the receptor language all that was meant in the source
language.
Similarly it is almost always impossible to render in the receptor
language only what was meant in the source language.
The translation of
sentence (1) as They got his car dirty loses the Image of affectedness meant by
the Spanish, and specifies the Image of possession, which is not meant by the
Spanish. Translations like They got the car dirty on him or They got his car
dirty on him also wind up changing the Image slightly, either through specifying
unpossession or through specifying possession again. There is no good way in
English to say exactly what sentence (1) says.
Of course, any of the three
sentences may be a good translation of (1) in some particular context, but they
will be saying something slightly different for all that. Part of what makes
translation such an extremely complex task is the fact that a translator is
constantly faced with decisions about what he will consider an important
component (or omission) of meaning in the source expression. He cannot render
everything in exactly the balance it had originally--and that balance itself is
a part of the !magic meaning. Often it will be very awkward to render certain
Imagic notions at all.
At other times it will be possible, but only at the
expense of upsetting the dynamics of the passage or straining the norms of the
language, as well as usually introducing extraneous !magic material.
Translation is a continual compromise between the desire to render the source
message faithfully and the desire to communicate well in the target language.
This way of looking at things also has implications for the traditional
debate concerning idiomatic vs. literal translation (e.g. Beekman and Callow
1974:19-32, Nida and Taber 1969:1-31). Idiomatic translations will often use a
target language expression. that has the same Functional meaning as the source
language expression, at the expense of obscuring some !magic difference which
could have been preserved.
Literal translations attempt to keep such !magic
distinctions, usually at the expense of naturalness, since the distinctions will
be awkward to code in the target language.
I suggest that it is this, rather
than a slavish adherence to the form of the source language, that lies behind
much literal translation: the literal translator is eager and willing to pay a
high price to render as much of the !magic meaning as he can. This conception
helps make it clear why some people so much dislike literal translations
(because the do not sound natural) and others dislike idiomatic translations
(because they do change the meaning).
4.

Summary

In this paper I have argued that the Spanish construction exemplified in
sentences (1) to (3) is not an example of PA and does not have the same meaning
as the English construe tion exemplified by the glosses to those sentences. I
have suggested that this implies that other cases where PA has been posited are
quite possibly not best analysed in that way, but as having a construction
parallel to the Spanish one.
I have also suggested that the notion of !magic
meaning and the fact that a paraphrase relationship can and often does coexist
with differences of Imagic meaning imply that the way we do syntax should be reexamined to make sure that it is not based on a covert assumption that
paraphrase implies semantic identity.
And I have suggested that translation
theory should allow for the fact that there is often no translation of a given
expression into a given language that will convey all and only the !magic
meaning of the original expression.
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FOOTNOTES
I would like to thank David Perlmutter for provoking, reading and
commenting on this paper and discussing at length the ideas behind it; Sandy
Chung for reading and commenting on it; and Ron Langacker for helping give the
conceptual framework for it and also for reading and discussing it.
lThe following is a list of abbreviations used in this paper, including some
that are introduced in the text.
1
2
3
lp. sg.
2p. pl.
(and
ACC
DAT
ED
ED-PO

Subject
Direct Object
Indirect Object
first person singular
second person plural
so on)
accusative (2-marking), or
3p. sg. accusative pronoun
dative (3-marking), or
3p. sg. dative pronoun
ethical dative
ethical datives together
with Possessor Omission

GR

H
OBJ

p
PA
PD
PO
Poss
RG
RN

grammatical relation
head
object marker
( "personal 'a'")
Predicate
Possessor Ascension
Possessor Deletion
Possessor Omission
Possessor
Relational Grammar
relational network

Masculine forms ("he", "him", "his") will be used to gloss 3p. sg. Spanish
forms.
2Actually, PA in its most general form would specify only that the ascendee
assumes a non-initial GR upstairs:
it is presumably a fact of Spanish rather
than of universal grammar that the GR is 3 here (Frantz 1979:30-32).
Throughout this paper I am assuming familiarity with the terminology and
viewpoint of Relational Grammar. See Perlmutter and Postal (to appear (a)).
3Perlmutter, class lectures.
As far as I know, a PA analysis has not been
claimed in print for Spanish, though it ( and other analyses parallel in
important ways) has been for other Romance languages (e.g. Frantz 1979: 31,
Perlmutter and Postal, to appear; Langacker 1968).
4crain 1979; Frantz 1979; Harris 1976, chapter 6; Allen, Frantz, Gardiner and
Perlmutter, to appear; Aissen 1979.
Srn Johnson
"erased" in
as deletion
(PD) rather

and Postal ( to appear) the downstairs arc of an Equi-victim is
the surface graph.
Since most people are used to thinking of Equi
rather than as erasure, however, I will refer to Possessor Deletion
than Possessor Erasure.

6rt is possible that this ~ould be analyzed not as an initial 3 but as a Goal
that advances to 3.
This would only strengthen the parallel with the ethical
datives (Section 1.1.2) which I will be claiming occur in (1)-(3) and "govern"
PO or PD just as these do.
7This argument is not all that strong.

Some syntactic rules, e.g., Gapping and
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VP-Deletion, only need to have their trigger precede rather than command their
target. Something very similar may be going on with PO or PD, whichever it is.
Also, it seems likely that discourse considerations are involved: cf. parallels
of these phenomena with Pronominalization. Also see especially Section 1.1.3.S.
Bit -would, I think, be in one sense in the semantic structure of the word fridge
in that one of the specifications of fridge would be that fridges typically are
personal or familial possessions.
But that specification would be totally
internal to the word fridge and would not be part of the semantics at the
sentence level.
In any case it would not be specific as to who is the
possessor. Possession might also be involved in the semantics of the phrase the
fridge if it is one of the things contextually utilized to provide uniqueness or
"definiteness".
9Actually the notion of "person or thing affected" is a semantic thread common
to most if not all datives in Spanish. Cf. Garcia's (1976) analysis of dative
clitics as direct objects of an abstract higher verb marked [+affect].
lOPerlmutter and Postal (to appear (b)).

It would be violated in sentences like
Those sentences are
difficult to translate; You said it to me on you is hardly acceptable English.
The idea is something like You went and said it to me (and so you'll have to
accept the blame).
Tu te me lo dijiste (you you:DAT me:DAT ACC you:said).

llThe se is treated, for simplicity's sake, as part of the verb, though I expect
that is ultimately wrong.
Also I am ignoring such possibilit~es as treating
aorir as an unaccusative verb.
12Note that it is not the case that seeing a possession cannot be construed as
affecting the possessor. For instance, in many Spanish speaking areas, it is a
shame to one to have one's legs seen by members of the opposite sex. Thus it is
perfectly appropriate to say Me vieron las piernas: 'They saw ay legs.' Or a
bookkeeper, especially if dishonest, could say of the company auditors, Me
vieron los libros: 'They saw my books'.
13K.obaron sus tres mil pesos: 'They stole his 3000 pesos' is grammatical, but
only because the possessive is being used in a "restrictive" sense.
It is
implied that there was a sum of 3000 pesos belonging to the man (usually all the
money he had) that the hearer was aware of before the sentence was uttered. Le
robaron sus tres mil pesos: 'They stole his 3000 pesos from him' is thus also
appropriate.
Note also, that, as mentioned in Section 1.1.3.4, the possessor may be
specified as such in any case where a different person is specified as the
victim of the crime (e.g. sentences (26)-(28)).
14Notice however that, as pointed out in the preceding section, (19) can be used
felicitously of a recently dead man.
!Sunder the following assumptions some sort of argument could be made from these
facts for PD as against PO: (i) Semantics is articulated with syntax only at
deep structure (or initial level), and (ii)
Rules like Passive and Subject
Postposing (or Preposing) are optional and not keyed to the presence or absence
of a possessor nor to any relevant semantic features.
Under such a model PO
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would have no way of getting needed information about the application or nonapplication of these rules, whereas PD could simply be ordered after them (i.e.
they could be constrained not to apply to structures involving PD).
In this as
in other things the problem of accounting for the absence of possessors is very
reminiscent of the problems of accounting for Pronominalization.
16For convenience I am including under the rubric of "truth conditions" some
other members of the category which may be more appropriately called "felicity
conditions". I think "truth values" are one special case (not the only one) of
"felicity values" in which clear judgments are possible.
17 Al though it has been pointed out that tests of this sort ( involving
conjunction and/or reduction) may not necessarily test exactly for vagueness
versus ambiguity and that they sometimes give equivocal results, it is clear
that they at least distinguish prototypically "vague" from prototypically
"ambiguous" pairs of expressions.
Thus, although passing the test does not
prove that the two expressions are vague, it at least damages the position that
they are ambiguous.
In any case, the only alternative to a test like Lakoff's
seems to be fiat declaration, which I am willing enough to make.
"They are
vague." So be it.
18Notice that the vagueness of (1) as indicated by (35) can also be used to
argue for PO as against PD.
19"Comparable conceptual situations can be construed in many different ways
(i.e. different perspectives can be taken on a scene and different facets of it
singled out for explicit attention) both at the conrete level and with respect
to the more abstract relations symbolized by 'grammatical morphemes'.
Conventional imagery of this kind is an important aspect of linguistic structure
and leads to the situation where two languages code the same conceptual scene in
semantic (hence grammatical) structures that differ greatly in specifics despite
being functionally equivalent." (Langacker 1980:33)
20rn another sense, the Functional and Truth-value distinctions can be viewed as
primary in that they are more easily accessible, both to the linguist and to the
language learner.
My experience as an adult language learner (which is quite
compatible with what I remember of language learning as a child) is that one
usually learns the "meaning" of an expression in the !magic sense by observing
its "meaning" in the Functional and Truth-value sense:
seeing regularities in
the usage and non-usage of the expression (or of its parts) and inferring or
deducing the "meaning" of the cases where it is not clear from the cases where
it is.
(Whether, and to what extent, this is i nfl uenc ed by inbred
predispositions to certain "meanings" as opposed to others, I do not know.
Also, I am ignoring the important part that observation of such things as
periphrasis and antonymy or even direct explanation through periphrasis or
translation may play in all this.)
Similarly it often proves necessary for
linguists to argue from Truth-value or Functional "meanings" to establish an
!magic "meaning", viewing it as a hypothesis justified by the fact that it
elegantly accounts for the Functional and Truth-value distinctions.
(Often, of
course, important aspects of the !magic "meaning" are assumed rather than argued
for, and conveyed through periphrasis or translation. Many examples of this can
be found in the preceding sections.) In a sense, then, the !magic distinctions
may be viewed as projections or extrapolations of Truth-value or Functional
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distinctions to cases not distinguishable by the Truth-value or Functional
Cri terions.
However, once the language learner has mastered the expression,
that extrapolation or hypothesis becomes part of the semantic structure of the
expression.
It is, I would claim, "psychologically real"--objectively there
whether it is producing Functional or Truth-value distinctions or not.
I would claim, then, that what people do when they judge whether two
expressions "mean" the same thing or not is to compare the two !magic "meanings"
(which are the psychologically real ones) and judge (by an extralinguistic
conceptual faculty-see Section 1.2.1.1.4). the extent to which these two
"meanings" are alike. We know that two expressions "mean" the same thing in a
weakened sense (like the Functional sense in that it is a matter of degree and
relative to context and purpose but unlike it in that it does not depend on
functional interchangeability) when we see important similarities in their
!magic "meanings".
21This example is from David Perlmutter.
22For some speakers of English it is more felicitous to say I sat (or laid) him
down; for some the sentence in the text may actually be inappropriate. For such
speakers, it would thus seem that the reflexive component of the prototypical
act of sitting down is part of (at least one salient version of) the "meaning"
of sit/lie down. Notice that this component of the semantics would not be given
a separate overt coding. (For a good example of analysis showing the need to
posit more than one version (subschema) of the semantics of predicates and
constructions, see Lindner (1980)).
231 am not claiming that !magic meanings always show up coded explicitly by some
However, I do
word or morpheme; see for instance the preceding footnote.
believe that very often morphemes that have been treated as "meaningless" code
some "meaning" in the sense of the !magic Criterion; some change of image or
shift of conceptual viewpoint, increasing the salience of some elements in the
conceived scene, and decreasing that of others down to the point of not
specifying them at all; i.e. leaving them vague.
24The last clause of this sentence is question-begging to a certain extent:
crucial to the idea of PA in Spanish is the proposal that sentences like (1) do
have an initial Poss arc, though admittedly not a surface one. But the point is
that if there is no semantic possession in the Spanish sentence (or perhaps even
if there is--see the next section) there is no reason to posit any syntactic
Poss arc.
Similarly, if "affectedness" is not included in the English
semantics, there is no reason to posit any GRx arc corresponding to that of the
ED of Spanish.
25The meaning with respect to whether or not the understood possessor is
affected is not represented equally by PA and PD. Under PD the Spanish has an
ED whereas the English does not; under PA neither does. If it could be shown
that the English and Spanish sentences do in fact have the same meaning with
respect to affectedness this could perhaps be made into an argument for PA over
ED-PO.
In fact it can be shown (Sections 1.1.2 and 2.2) that they differ
exactly as predicted by the claim that the Spanish sentences do have ED's.
26rt might seem attractive to claim that these cases where I have talked about a
different person from the possessor being the referent of the dative are
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actually cases of some sort of attenuated possession.
For example, for all
three sentences (1)-(3), on the reading where! is affected by what heppens to
A's possessions, the usage is most felicitous where B has either physical
possession of or at least responsibility for A's possession. Thus (1) is most
appropriate if the car is in B's possession, even if it is not his car, and (2)
when Bis carrying A's money, e>r at least responsible for it. Thus, it might be
claimed, it would be appropriate to have a Poss arc attached to the nominal, and
these sentences would also be examples of PA.
The objection to that is that
then there would be no way to distinguish between such cases of "attenuated
possession" and cases of true possession.
This would have the following
consequences:
The parallel with languages like English would be destroyed
(Argument B); to be consistent we would have to posit Poss arcs in English
sentences such as 'Ibey stole all the money from him, and there would be no way
to distinguish those Poss arcs (which cannot surface as possessive pronouns)
from those associated with real possessives. And, in sentences like those to be
discussed in the next section, there would be two Poss arcs, one somehow to be
interpreted as attenuated and the other not, one able to suffer PA and the other
not, both attached to the same nominal node. Thus I conclude that "attenuated
possession" and real possession must be distinguished anyway, and that trying to
extend PA to cases of "attenuated possession" is of no real benefit".
27contrast this with cases of Equi, where an NP is not simply omitted but rather
specified at some linguistic level(s) though not at the surface.
28Hollander is well aware of the problem I am discussing:
he sees the
alternatives as either "to assert the 'form-content' dichotomy against all usual
better judgment", or to succumb (as I have) to "the specter of the 'organic'
view", which would "probably end up by asserting that translation is impossible
under any circumstances", or, apparently preferably, to avoid the whole issue of
meaning and discuss "how people react to the literary works themselves" (pp.
207-208).
(Cf. Nida and Taber's (1969) embracing of "dynamic equivalence" as
the criterion for good translation.)
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